OCAW V. AMERICAN CYANAMID: THE SHRINKING OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
RICHARD LEwIst

In 1978 the American Cyanamid Company initiated a policy at its
chemical plant in Willow Island, West Virginia that led to the surgical
sterilization of five women employees.' The policy was designed to
eliminate the risk of fetal exposure to toxic workplace chemicals 2 by
assuring that no women who could possibly carry a fetus were present
in designated areas of the plant.' Company personnel, including the
t B.A. 1976, Tufts University; M.P.H. 1981, University of Michigan School of
Public Health; J.D. Candidate, 1986, University of Pennsylvania. The author wrote
this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444,
445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2 See id. at 446.
3 The company's sterilization policy, which was adopted primarily in response to
hazards to fetuses associated with lead, see id. at 446, applied only to women. According to expert testimony presented during Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rulemaking on the lead standard, hazards to fetuses are not completely
eliminated by keeping fertile and pregnant women out of a lead-exposure workplace;
exposure of male employees may also be hazardous. Although the exposure of men to
lead toxicity results primarily in decreased sex drive, impotence, and sterility, sperm
cells can be affected and in some cases pass on genetic damage to fetuses. See OSHA
Preamble to Final Standards, Occupational Exposure to Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,952,
52,959-60 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OSHA Lead Preamble]. Thus, American Cyanamid's sterilization policy was vulnerable to attack as illegal sex discrimination.
The Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers union and the women affected by American Cyanamid's sterilization policy filed suit under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982), but this suit ended in
settlement. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d
444, 450 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Recent decisions, however, hold that a reproductive
hazards policy applicable solely to women may violate Title VII. In Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), the court held that evidence of the existence and
operation of Olin's "fetal vulnerability" program, which restricted women's contact
with certain toxic chemicals, established a prima facie violation of Title VII. Olin could
overcome this presumption of violation, however, by establishing that, because the
chemicals posed a reproductive risk for fertile and pregnant women but not for men,
the policy was a business necessity. Id. at 1189-90. In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (l1th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit followed the Olin approach, holding that a hospital's policy of dismissing pregnant x-ray technicians was
presumed to be facially discriminatory under Title VII. The hospital could overcome
this presumption by demonstrating that the offspring of women who were exposed to xrays while fertile or pregnant faced a substantial risk of harm, whereas the offspring of
male workers exposed to x-rays faced no such risk. Id. at 1548 & n.8; see also Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the hospital's
concern for risks to fetuses and fear of liability did not constitute "business necessity"
where the hospital could have employed a less discriminatory alternative by granting a
(1167)
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plant manager, doctor, and nurse, conducted a series of small group
meetings with women employees. At these meetings, the company explained that any woman between the ages of sixteen and fifty would be
deemed of child-bearing capacity and would be terminated unless she
presented proof of surgical sterilization.4 There were thirty women employed throughout the plant, but upon full implementation of the policy, there would be only seven jobs available in the plant for the women
who had not chosen sterilization. 5 For the women who did not obtain
one of the seven positions, the policy presented a choice between undergoing sterilization and being fired. Five women, who were being exposed to lead in the inorganic pigments department, underwent surgical
sterilization between the months of February and July 1978.6
In 1979, the Secretary of Labor cited the Willow Island plant for
a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act or
Act) "general duty clause."'7 The citation, which alleged that the employer's sterilization policy was a hazard that violated the OSH Act,
read as follows:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of
employment which were free from recognized hazards that
were causing or were likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that: The employer adopted and
implemented a policy which required women employees to
be sterilized in order to be eligible to work in the areas of the
plant where they would be exposed to certain toxic
substances ....

'

The company contested this citation and won on a motion for
summary judgment before an administrative law judge.' This result
leave of absence rather than terminating a pregnant x-ray technician); Andrade, The
Toxic Workplace: Title VII Protectionfor the PotentiallyPregnant Person, 4 HARV.
WOMEN'S

L.J. 71 (1981).

" See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444,
446 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

See id.
See id.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)
(1982). The clause reads as follows: "Each employer . . . shall furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees . . ..
5
8

8 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 447

(D.C. Cir. 1984).
' American Cyanamid Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 24,720. The Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers union represented the women affected by the sterilization policy.
The union exercised its right to participate as a party to the proceedings at the ALJ
level, see Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)
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was affirmed first by the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission 0 and then by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co. (OCAW).11
Writing for the court, Judge Bork ruled that a policy requiring sterilization is not a "hazard" within the meaning of the general duty clause
of the OSH Act.1 2
(1982), and filed the petition for review at the circuit court level. The union, however,
mistakenly named the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission as the respondent. Subsequently, the union filed a motion to dismiss the Commission as respondent on appeal and make American Cyanamid the respondent instead. This motion was
granted. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 671 F.2d 643, 653 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982).
10 American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
25,338.
, 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In reaching its decision the OCAW court employed three techniques of statutory construction: reliance on precedent, reliance on
congressional intent, and reliance on a policy to limit employer liability. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) relied solely on an analysis of
congressional intent. See American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
25,338, at 31,430. The Commission's decision was restricted to a construction of the
general duty clause, section 5(a)(1), whereas the OCAW court's construction extended
to the purpose section and addressed the scope of the entire act. See infra notes 79-84
and accompanying text. Although the OCAW court expressed its agreement with sections of the Commission's congressional intent discussion, it did not defer to the Commission, but rather gave the Act its own construction. Where the congressional intent is
clear, the deference issue is never reached. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-82 (1984); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31 (1981). Judge Bork found that, since it was difficult to
speculate about what Congress's intent with respect to the general duty clause would
have been had it actually considered the "hazard" of employer-offered choice between
injury and discharge, it was "safer" to confine the general duty clause to hazards that
"we know Congress had in mind." OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449.
12 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449. This Comment's primary criticism of the OCAW decision is that it incorrectly construed the OSH Act in finding that the Secretary did not
have the statutory authority even to reach the company sterilization requirement. If the
OCAW court had found that the Secretary did have the authority to reach the sterilization requirement, that alone would not have been sufficient to give effect to the citation
under the general duty clause. To issue a citation under the general duty clause, the
Secretary must state with particularity precisely what the employer has done wrong,
describe specific steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation, and demonstrate the feasibility of taking those steps. See, e.g., Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645
F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1981).
Had the American Cyanamid citation not been dismissed at the summary judgment stage, there would have been an inquiry into the possibility of abating the hazard.
There are at least five possible means of protecting the fetus from lead exposure that,
applied independently or in combination, offer alternatives to requiring the sterilization
of women workers: (1) reduction of ambient air lead levels; (2) reduction of lead levels
in the blood of fertile women employees; (3) medical surveillance and removal of fertile
women whose blood lead levels exceed a standard deemed to be unsafe for pregnant
women (OSHA sets this level at 30 milligrams per 100 grams of blood, see OSHA
Lead Preamble, supra note 3, at 52,960); (4) family planning to prevent pregnancy of
lead-exposed workers; and (5) the shutdown of production in areas of the plant where
workers' blood lead levels exceed the OHSA standard for pregnant women. Each of
these alternatives was deemed infeasible or ineffective by American Cyanamid. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 20 n.28, 22 n.29, 23 n.30, OCAW; see also infra note 54
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In Part I of this Comment I offer a critique of the OCAW decision. First, I focus on Judge Bork's determination of the scope of the
OSH Act, in which he relied on precedent, congressional intent, and a
policy argument for limiting employer liability. I contend that the court
misapplied these techniques of statutory construction and thus misconstrued the Act. Second, I discuss the potentially grave impact on occupational health policy that the decision forbodes. In Part II, based on
statutory language, legislative history, and OSH Act case law, I suggest
an alternative approach to determining the scope of the Act that focuses
on the employer's role in creating hazards. This approach would both
protect worker health and establish a limit to employer liability. Unlike
Judge Bork's formulation, it avoids a draconian choice between limitless liability and employer immunity.
I.

THE

OCAW DECISION: CRITIQUE

A. Judge Bork's Construction of the OSH Act
Judge Bork's finding that American Cyanamid's sterilization policy did not qualify as a hazard under the OSH Act was based on his
interpretation of precedent and congressional intent as well as on his
fear that to find otherwise would lead to "unforeseeable consequences"
in the form of unbounded employer liability.13
1. Precedent
The OSH Act's purpose and policy section sets out the goal of
assuring "safe and healthful working conditions." 4 Arguing that the
"statement of purpose and policy must be considered in construing
other sections of the Act," 5 Judge Bork looked to judicial interpretation of the term "working conditions" to determine the scope of the
hazards amenable to OSHA jurisdiction under the general duty
clause.16
The Supreme Court formulated a definition of "working conditions" when construing the Equal Pay Act of 196317 in Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan1 "[T]he element of working conditions encom(discussing feasibility of reducing ambient air lead levels).
13 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 450.
14 Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1982).
15 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 447.
16 See id. at 448.
17 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
lB

417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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passes two subfactors: 'surroundings' and 'hazards.' 'Surroundings'
measures the elements, such as toxic chemicals or fumes, regularly encountered by a worker . . . 'Hazards' takes into account the physical
hazards regularly encountered .... 2 9

Judge Bork transferred this definition of working conditions to the
OSH Act, reasoning that "[tihe language of industrial relations, [used
to define working conditions in Corning Glass] . . .is as relevant to

the OSH Act as to the Equal Pay Act." 20 This is, in effect, an in pari
materia21 argument. If two statutes are in pari materia, "impressions
derived from one statute should be allowed to influence judgment about
how another statute should be interpreted. '2 2 However, even statutes
concerning the same subject matter are not necessarily considered in
pari materia, if the objects or purposes of the two statutes are different:23 "[A] determination under one statute [should not] be mechanically carried over in the interpretation of another statute involving significantly different considerations and legislative purposes."'2 4
As evidenced by the Supreme Court's construction of the two statutes, the purposes of the OSH Act and the Equal Pay Act were fundamentally different: "Congress' purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act
was to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem
of employment [sex] discrimination in private industry .... ,25 The
purpose of the OSH Act, on the other hand, was "to prevent occupational deaths and serious injuries."2 6 When two statutes have fundamentally different purposes, as do the Equal Pay Act and the OSH
Act, it is an abuse of in pari materia construction to use one to define
19 Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
20 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 448.
21 "Upon the same matter or subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed.

1979).

22 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03, at 298 (4th
ed. 1973).
23 Id. at 298-99.
2 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 110 (1958); cf.
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 511 n.30 (1981) ("The error
of several cases finding a cost-benefit analysis mandate in the [OSH] Act is their reliance on the different language and clear legislative history of the Consumer Product
Safety Act to reach their conclusions.") (emphasis added).
The OCAW court focused on the fact that the same term-"working conditions"-is used in both the Equal Pay Act and the OSH Act. In the Equal Pay Act,
however, that term derives its meaning from a clear legislative history, see Coming
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 & n.20 (1974), that has no relevance to
the construction of the OSH Act. The OSH Act's legislative history is silent on the
meaning of the term "working conditions."
25 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
28 Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
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the scope of the other.2 7
The second and final case relied on by the OCAW court to define
the terms "working conditions" and "hazards" was Southern Railway
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.28 Southern
Railway concerned section (4)(b)(1) of the OSH Act, which is designed
to prevent duplicative regulation of the same safety hazard by two different federal agencies.2" The Southern Railway court found that "the
term 'working conditions' as used in Section 4(b)(1) means the environmental area in which an employee customarily goes about his daily
tasks." 30 Judge Bork adopted this definition in OCAW, arguing that
"[alIthough a different section of the Act was involved in Southern Ry.,
we can think of no reason why the definition given of 'working conditions' should not apply to Section 2(b) [the purpose section] and hence
influence the concept of hazards in the general duty clause."31
Again, however, Judge Bork's statutory construction rested on an
inadequate foundation. Just as relying on one statute to interpret another may be inconsistent with the rule of in pari materia, so may
relying on one section of a statute to interpret another section. 2 As the
Supreme Court has noted, the presumption that identical words used in
different parts of the same statute are intended to have the same meaning is not so rigid that it cannot yield to a different interpretation that
better effectuates the purpose of the statute: 3
Most words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in
the same statute or even in the same section. . . . Where the
scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader
than that exercised in another, the meaning well may vary to
meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a considera217 Cf Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 156 F.2d 346 (1946), affd, 330 U.S.
248 (1947) (rejecting use of in pari materia construction where "[i]t is obvious that the
Transportation Act of 1940 . . . is not concerned with the same subject matter . . . so
as to call for the application of the rule").
28 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
29 Section (4)(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 653 (b)(1) (1982), provides, "Nothing in this
chapter shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other
Federal agencies, and State agencies acting under section 2021 of Title 42, exercise
statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health."
30 Southern Railway, 539 F.2d at 339.
x OCAW, 741 F.2d at 448.
22

See 2A C.

SANDS,

supra note 22, at 299.

See Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927);
Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916).
32
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tion of the language in which those purposes are expressed,
and of the circumstances under which the language was
employed."'
In its description of the purpose of the OSH Act, the Southern
Railway court itself provided a compelling reason why its definition of
"working conditions" under section (4)(b)(1) should not be applied to
other sections of the statute. Section 4(b)(1) is the only section of the
Act that exempts hazards from coverage; the remainder of the Act
grants authority to the Secretary to regulate hazards. The Southern
Railway court explicitly stated that it was defining "'working conditions' as used in Section 4(bXl). ' 3 5 This qualification was necessary
because section 4(b)(1) employs words of limitation in the larger context of a remedial safety statute. The Southern Railway court recognized that section 4(b)(1) must be construed narrowly in contrast to the
remainder of the Act:
[T]he scope of the Congressional objective requires that
this "[r]emedial social legislation [the OSH Act]

. .

.be con-

strued liberally in favor of the workers whom it was
designed to protect, and any exemption from its terms must
be narrowly construed." Accordingly, the exemptive statute
should appropriately be construed to achieve the maximum
protection for the industrial workers of the Nation."
The Southern Railway definition of "working conditions" was developed in the unique context of construing an exemption. Judge
Bork's application of this narrow definition to the purpose section both
violated a basic tenet of statutory construction and distorted the remedial purpose of the OSH Act.
2.

Congressional Intent

Judge Bork adopted the Occupational Health and Safety Review
Commission's reading of OSH Act legislative history to infer a congressional intent to exclude employer policies from OSH Act jurisdiction:
The Commission pointed out that the Act does not define the
Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
539 F.2d at 339 (emphasis added).
36 539 F.2d at 338 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co.,
373 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1967)); accord Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1,
13 (1980) ("[S]afety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose."); id. at 12 ("To accomplish [the OSH Act's] basic purpose, the legislation's remedial orientation is prophylactic in nature.").
35
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word "hazard" and turned to the legislative history for guidance. "Congressional floor debates [and] committee reports . . . are replete with discussions of air pollutants, in-

dustrial poisons, combustibles and explosives, unsafe work
practices and inadequate training . . . " From this, and
other evidence . . ., the commission concluded that "Con-

gress conceived of occupational hazards in terms of processes
and materials [that operate] directly upon employees as they
engage in work related activities.""7
Congressional concern with tangible hazards should not, however,
be read as congressional intent to exclude other types of hazards from
the reach of the Act, particularly those inknown at the time of enactment. "The rule that a statute will operate prospectively so as to include circumstances unknown at the time of enactment has been employed in the construction of . . . remedial statutes."3

The Supreme

Court "frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to
the 'particular application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.' ",1,

Supreme Court cases dealing with the application of a statute to
an issue not mentioned in the legislative history support the idea that
illustrative applications of the act noted in the legislative history need
not necessarily determine the scope of the statute.40 Where the legislative history is silent, the Court reads the language of the relevant clause
in light of the historical backround of the statute to determine if Congress' "choice of language . . . fairly brings a given situation within a

statute."'" Thus, legislative silence alone does not indicate a congressional intent to exclude. A deeper inquiry into the language of the statute is required to determine if a situation, unknown at the time of en37 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449 (quoting American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H.
Dec. (0CH) 1 25,338, at 31,430, 31,431).
" 2A C. SANDS, supra note 22, § 49.02, at 230 (4th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted).
" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (quoting Barr v. United
States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945)); see also Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339
(1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 257 (1937).
40 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937), demonstrates the Court's willingness to apply a statute to a situation not specifically contemplated by the legislators:
When the Sherman Act was passed (1890), we had no insular dependencies; and, necessarily, the application of § 3 did not extend beyond our
continental domain; and undoubtedly, it was this domain which was in the
immediate contemplation of Congress. Certainly, Congress at that time did
not have Puerto Rico in mind. But that is not enough. It is necessary to go
further and to say that if the acquisition of that insular dependency had
been foreseen, Congress would have so varied its comprehensive language
as to exclude it from the operation of the act.
Id. at 257.
41 Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945).
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actment, is fairly covered by the act. An analysis of the words of the act
and its purpose must demonstrate that, if the situation
had been fore42
seen, Congress would have explicitly excluded it.
Congressional concern with abatement of tangible hazards, as expressed in the legislative history, is not inconsistent with a concern for
abatement of other types of hazards to workers. Mere silence in the
legislative history on the issue of sterilization requirements provides inadequate support for the finding that Congress intended to exclude
such policies from the reach of the Act.
3.

Limiting Liability: The Threat of "Unforeseeable Consequences"

Defining the limits of employer liability under the OSH Act is a
major concern running throughout Judge Bork's OCAW opinion. On
no less than four occasions the opinion expresses this concern, referring
to the specter of "unforeseen liabilities,"'" "unforeseeable scope,""4
"unforeseeable consequences," 45 and the need to find "some limit to the
statute's reach."46 Judge Bork formulated the case so that the court's
only choice was between a legal rule which imposed liability "in all
circumstances imaginable" 47 and one that immunized hazardous employer policies from the Act.
Given the choice between these two rules, the court's decision to
limit liability was reasonably consistent with one of the Act's unstated
constraints: "Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out of business . . . . The
court's interpretation of the Act, however, gave short shrift to the primary purpose of the Act-protection of employee health: "When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, it chose
to place pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and healthful
working environment, limited only by the feasibility of achieving such
an environment." 49 Thus, while it would be senseless to suggest that
the Act imposes limitless liability on employers, this does not justify the
42

44
45

See Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 257 (1937).
O430CAW, 741 F.2d at 449.

Id.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 449.
47 Id.
48 Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). OSH
Act requirements may, however, be "financially burdensome," "affect profit margins
adversely," and lead to the "economic demise of an employer who has lagged behind
the rest of the industry . . . and is consequently unable to comply with new standards." Id.
49 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1980). The feasibility referred to is both economic and technological. Id. at 513 n.31.
46
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court's finding that an employer policy requiring women workers to be
sterilized or be fired is beyond the scope of the Act.
Judge Bork reasoned that the sterilization policy lay beyond the
Act's scope because the harm suffered by sterilized employees resulted
not from the policy but rather from the employees' decision to be sterilized as influenced by " 'economic and social factors which operate primarily outside the workplace.' " He then argued that requiring such
a decision could not be an OSH Act "hazard":
Were we to decide otherwise, we would have to adopt a
broad principle of unforeseeable scope: any employer policy
which, because of employee economic incentives, left open an
option exercised outside the workplace [would make] the employer liable under the general duty clause. 5 '
Recasting the sterilization policy as an economic and social issue
that was external to employment was, however, wrong as a matter of
fact and was used to support a conclusion that was wrong as a matter
of law.
First, information presented in the union's brief,52 and referred to
in the OCAW decision itself,5" indicates that Judge Bork's characterization of the sterilization requirement was factually inaccurate. American
Cyanamid developed the sterilization policy in response to an existent
lead hazard. 5 ' The policy resulted from company decisions that were
within the company's power to modify. American Cyanamid determined that surgical sterilization was the only course for women of
childbearing age who wished to retain jobs in the affected areas of the
plant. Even a woman whose husband had been surgically sterilized was
10 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449 (quoting American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H.
Dec. (CCH) 23,338, at 31,431) ("The decision to be sterilized 'grows out of economic
and social factors which operate primarily outside the workplace,' and hence the fetus
protection policy 'is not a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause.' ").
51 Id.
52 Brief for Petitioners at 2-10, OCAW, 741 F.2d 444.
53 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 445-46.
" Judge Bork noted prior decisions indicating the economic and technological infeasibility of lowering the ambient air lead level in the inorganic pigments department
to 50 micrograms per cubic meter, the level deemed by OHSA to provide minimally
acceptable protection for the fetus. See OCAW, 741 F.2d at 446 (citing American Cyanamid Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CH) 24,828 (economically infeasible to reduce ambient air lead levels at Willow Island plant to 200 micrograms per cubic meter)); id.
(citing United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981) (OSHA did not meet burden of showing the technological
feasibility of an ambient air lead standard for the pigment industry of 50 micrograms
per cubic meter)); see also OSHA Lead Preamble, supra note 3, at 52,966 (stating that
compliance with an air standard of 50 micrograms per cubic meter, in addition to other
protective measures, "should effectively minimize any risk to the fetus").
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required to undergo sterilization; the husband's sterility was deemed
insufficient to ensure that the woman would avoid pregnancy. 5
The company's medical and industrial relations personnel conducted educational programs on the nature of the surgery. Women
workers were told that sterilization would be required of those women
exposed to a number of undisclosed chemicals in use at the Willow
Island plant, and that surgical sterilization would become a condition of
employment throughout the chemical industry. 6 The women were also
told that their company medical insurance would cover the operation
and that sick leave would be provided. 7 Finally, and most importantly,
the company required women employees to undergo sterilization to
keep their jobs."8 Given the company's exclusive role in developing and
implementing the policy as a response to workplace toxins, it was a
factual distortion to describe the decision to be sterilized as resulting
from factors external to the workplace. Actually at issue was a
mandatory condition of employment imposed on women workers by
their employer.
Second, the OCAW court concluded, as a matter of law, that the
Secretary did not have the authority under the general duty clause to
reach "economic and social factors that operate primarily outside the
workplace." 59 This interpretation of the OSH Act cannot be correct
where the economic factor in question amounts to forcing women employees to choose between forfeiting their jobs and enduring the certain
harm of sterilization.
Before the enactment of the OSH Act, workers could choose to
give up their jobs rather than expose themselves to hazards. This was
the choice women employees faced at the Willow Island plant. Legislative history and judicial precedent indicate that the OSH Act is intended to prohibit employers from forcing workers to choose between
their health and their jobs. In the words of a House report, "Today's
law and practices allow workers to receive thousands of cases of occupational disease and illness without any effective protection ....
[The worker] should not be economically coerced into a hazardous
job."o
55 See Brief for Petitioners at 4, OCAW.
56 See id. at 6.
57 See OCAW, 741 F.2d at 446.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 449 (quoting American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
25,338, at 31,431).
60 H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970); see also id. at 30 (The
"danger that an employee may be economically coerced into self-exposure in order to
earn his livelihood" is unacceptable.). Both of these statements were made during the
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1 holding
The Supreme Court, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,"
that the OSH Act prohibits job discrimination against employees who
refuse life-threatening job assignments,0 2 stated, "It would seem anomalous to construe an Act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an
employee, with no other reasonable alternative, the freedom to withdraw from a workplace environment that he reasonably believes is
highly dangerous."' The Whirlpool Court unanimously affirmed the
circuit court's holding on the impermissibility of the choice between
work and health: "The district courts have sanctioned an employer's
right to make workers choose between their jobs and their lives. We
cannot agree that the statute was ever intended to require placing an
employee in such an untenable position."'"
In Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor,"5 a case concerning
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulation of
migrant housing, the court, in determining the scope of the Act, considered the extent to which employees were subjected to employer coercion. 6 The court upheld OSHA's "conditions of employment" test as
an appropriate basis to determine jurisdiction.67 In this case, the key
factor in the test was whether the employer required the workers to
reside in the housing or whether an employee elected to do so voluntarily: "Only if company policy or practicalnecessity force workers to live
in employer provided housing is the degree of coercion such that the
hazards . . .come under the scope of the Act." 68 The court found, as a
factual matter, that the employees were not required either by employer policy or geographical necessity to dwell in the apartments6 and
discussion of a proposed version of § 19(a)(5) of the Act, which would have required
OSHA to inform workers of hazards and permitted the worker to "absent himself from
such risk of harm for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular
compensation for such period." Id. at 12. This "right to strike" provision was deleted
from the final version of the Act. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 14-16
(1980). The report is still relevant because it illustrates congressional concern that employees not be forced to choose between safety and a job, even though a different mechanism for protecting workers from such a choice-the right to request immediate Labor
Department inspections-was actually adopted by Congress.
61

445 U.S. 1 (1980).

The question presented to the Court was whether the OSHA regulation that
affords protection from discrimination against employees exercising the right to refuse
unsafe work, 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1984), is consistent with the Act.
445 U.S. at 12.
Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 1979), affid, 445

U.S. 1 (1980).
65 696 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1983).

See id. at 1333.
id.
"Id. (emphasis added).
61 See
69

See id. at 1327, 1332-33.
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thus held that OSHA did not have jurisdiction. As a legal matter, however, the decision established a mandatory "condition of employment"
test as the criterion for determining OSHA jurisdiction over employerowned migrant housing.70 If the workers had been required to live in
the employer's housing in order to keep their jobs, such housing would
have been subject to OSHA regulation "even though these places would
not otherwise be 'workplaces' and even though the hazards . . . are
'
different in kind and quality from most occupational hazards." 71
The language of the OCAW decision itself suggests that the American Cyanamid workers' decisions to be sterilized should not be characterized as resulting exclusively from "economic and social factors." Immediately following the "economic and social factors" discussion, the
court states that "the Act should not be read to make an employer liable for every employee reaction to the employer's policies." 72 Thus,
within the same paragraph, the court suggests that a worker's decision
to be sterilized results both from "economic and social factors operating
primarily outside the workplace," and from employer policies. While it
is true that the choices employees make in response to some employer
policies necessarily are affected by external "economic and social factors," it is nonsense to characterize a policy designed, implemented, and
enforced by the employer as external to the workplace.
B.

Potential Impact of OCAW

The OCAW decision has two notably pernicious consequences.
First, lead, the toxin responsible for American Cyanamid's sterilization
policy, is just one of many chemicals and physical agents shown to have
adverse effects on the offspring of exposed workers. Other recognized
hazards include pesticides, ionizing radiation, solvents used in manufacturing rubber, anesthetic gases used in operating rooms, and metals
used in the smelting industry. It is likely that as laboratory and epide70

71
72

See id. at 1332, 1333.
Id. at 1333.
OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449.

7
Dibromochloropropane, a pesticide, and lead, associated mainly with the battery industry, have been identified as reproductive hazards acting on sperm. See
Klingberg, Papier & Hart, Birth Defects Monitoring, 117 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 309, 314 (1983); see also Meyer, Critical Review of Studies

Relating OccupationalExposure of Males and Reproductive Capacity, 160 PROGRESS
IN CLINICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 375, 376 (1984); Rom, Effects of Lead on
Reproduction, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 81-100, PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP ON METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS IN THE

WORKPLACE 33-34 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. Other chemical or

physical agents associated with effects on semen quality include kepone (chlorodecone)
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miological techniques improve more workplace reproductive hazards
will be identified.7 4
With the exceptions of the OSHA lead7 5 and ethylene oxide 6
standards, OSHA has not promulgated regulations regarding reproductive hazards. There is a pressing need for the control of reproductive
hazards in a number of industries.7 7 Under the OCAW decision, employers in all industries exposing workers to reproductive hazards could
"control" such hazards by requiring that workers of either sex7 8 be

sterilized in order to keep jobs or to be hired.
Second, although the citation contested in OCAW was issued under
section 5 of the OSH Act-the general duty clause-the language of
the OCAW decision is not confined to section 5. Judge Bork found that
the term "hazard" in the general duty clause applied not to employer
policies but only to "physical condition[s] of the workplace,179 that is,
and ionizing radiation.
A series of studies in Sweden of female copper smelter workers who had been
exposed to copper, lead, arsenic, cadmium, and sulfur dioxide showed an increased
frequency of spontaneous abortions and malformations in offspring. See Hemminki,
Axelson, Niemi & Ahlborg, Assessment of Methods and Results of Reproductive OccupationalEpidemiology: Spontaneous Abortions and Malformations in the Offspring of
Working Women, 117 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 293, 30001 (1983), reprintedin 4 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 293, 300-01 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Hemminki & Axelson]. Scandinavian studies have indicated that female chemical and
rubber workers exposed to various solvents have experienced higher rates of adverse
reproductive effects than unexposed control groups. See id. at 301-02. Exposure of operating room personnel to anesthetic gases has been associated with an increased risk of
spontaneous abortions. See id. at 302; Cohen, Waste, Anesthetic Gas and Reproductive
Health in OperatingRoom Personnel, in PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 73. Maternal exposure to pesticides has also been associated with defects in offspring. See Hemminki &
Axelson, supra, at 304-05. For a discussion of several early studies on the effects of
lead on reproduction, see PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 33-34.
74 See Meyer, supra note 73, at 381 ("With the discovery of new sensitive laboratory analytical techniques and the use of sophisticated epidemiological methods, new
studies will help define the impact of occupational exposures to chemical and physical
agents on the reproductive potential of man.").
75 See OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1984).
71 See OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances: Ethylene Oxide, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1047 (1984).
7
Cf.Ashford & Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: A Prescriptionfor Prevention, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 529 (1983) ("The
human risks posed by reproductive hazards in the workplace are both serious and farreaching.").
'8 Judge Bork's analysis in no way depended on the sex of the workers affected by
American Cyanamid's policy; the result would have been the same if men had been
singled out for sterilization. The company was cited by OSHA for creating a hazard to
workers, not for sex discrimination. The fact that the policy applied only to women
would have been relevant if the court reached the abatement inquiry described supra
note 12.
79 OCAW, 741 F.2d at 444.
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to tangible hazards such as chemical fumes or unsafe machines. The
OCAW court's definition of "hazard" followed from the prior definition
it gave to "working conditions." "Working conditions" is a key term in
section 2 of the Act, the statement and purpose section: "The Congress
declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources . ... ""
Reasoning that the purpose section bears on other sections of the
81
Act, the court found that the definition of "working conditions" "influence[s] the concept of 'hazards' in the general duty clause."8" Neither
the term "working conditions" nor "hazards" is defined by the statute.
In defining these two key statutory terms, the OCAW court has limited
the Secretary's authority under both section 5, the "general duty" section and section 6,83 the standard-setting section. Both sections use the
term "hazard" and both sections would be influenced by the purpose
section's definition of "working conditions." Consequently, the impact
of OCAW goes beyond the "general duty clause" and reaches the Secretary's general regulatory authority. The OCAW decision suggests that
OSHA lacks the authority not only to cite employers for hazardous
policies under the general duty clause, but also to prohibit such policies
under section 6 standards. Under the OCAW court's construction of the
Act, company policies not concerning physical conditions of the workplace, yet having an impact on employee health, would fall beyond the
scope of the Act.
One example of an employer policy that is harmful to worker
health is a requirement that employees undergo prophylactic chelation
therapy. Prophylactic chelation is the routine administration of chelating agents to reduce the level of lead in the blood. Because chelating
agents have dangerous side effects, including liver and kidney damage,
nausea, nervousness, and transient high blood pressure, the medical
consensus is that chelation should be used only as an emergency measure to treat manifest symptoms of lead poisoning, not as routine prophylaxis.8 4 In a provision of the OSHA lead standard, promulgated
pursuant to the Secretary's section 6 regulatory authority, OSHA prohibited employers from implementing policies calling for prophylactic
80 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1982).
11 See OCAW, 741 F.2d at 447 ("This statement of purpose and policy must be
considered in construing all other provisions of the Act.").
82
83
94

Id. at 448.

Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982).
See OSHA Lead Preamble, supra note 3, at 53,001-02.
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chelation. 5 In short, OSHA concluded that prophylactic chelation is
"unacceptable whatever the setting," whether in the workplace or in
the doctor's office.8 6 The OCAW decision, in that it defines hazards to
exclude employer policies, undermines the Secretary's authority as exercised in promulgating and enforcing the regulation banning prophylactic chelation.
Policies requiring sterilization and prophylactic chelation are similar: both cause harm to the employee outside the workplace, and both
are imposed as a condition of employment. The OSHA ban on prophylactic chelation focuses on the employer's role in requiring workers to
undergo harm. Similarly, it was the employer's role in requiring workers to undergo the harm of sterilization that the Secretary tried to regulate by requiring abatement of the American Cyanamid sterilization
policy. Effectively, employees are economically coerced to conform with
both policies."' The ban on prophylactic chelation demonstrates that
worker health will receive inadequate protection unless OSHA authority extends beyond tangible workplace hazards. If courts adopt the
OCAW rationale in other contexts, industries will be free to adopt dangerous policies-similar to a prophylactic chelation requirement-unhampered by OSHA regulation.
II.

FINDING THE LIMIT OF THE ACT: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO

OSHA

JURISDICTION

The OCAW decision rested on two problematic assumptions. First,
the court assumed that all worker health hazards result exclusively either from "tangible hazards such as chemicals" 8 or from "economic
and social conditions acting primarily outside the workplace." 8 Second,
having established this rigid characterization scheme, the court assumed
that the Act could reach only the tangible threats to worker health and
safety. In the real world of worker health, however, many hazards will
not be understood, identified, or remedied under this rigid scheme.
Having decided that employers would be faced with limitless lia85

See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j)(4) (1984) (prohibiting prophylactic chelation but

allowing therapeutic or diagnostic chelation under medical supervision).
86 OSHA Lead Preamble, supra note 3, at 53,002.
8 In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), the Court noted that "workers often consumed self-prescribed chelating agents, and lied to physicians about their subjective symptoms, all
because they held job security more dear than their health." Id. at 1237 (footnote
omitted).
" OCAW, 741 F.2d at 449.
19 Id. (quoting American Cyanimid [sic] Co., 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 25,338,
at 31,431).
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bility if hazards related to economic and social factors gave rise to
OSHA jurisdiction, Judge Bork, in effect, created a choice between two
draconian 9" alternatives: limitless liability or no liability at all. Opting
for the latter alternative forced an inappropriately narrow interpretation of the statute that nullified the effect of language in fundamental
sections of the Act. 91 A more realistic and flexible view of the multiplicity of factors that create worker health hazards would have allowed the
court to give effect to the dual concerns of protecting employee health
and limiting employer liability.
The following examination of the language and history of the
OSH Act and of cases interpreting the Act suggests a more balanced
approach: courts should focus on the employer's role in creating
hazards. Under this approach, liability follows responsibility; the Act
protects workers from the hazards of their employment without regard
to artificial and unrealistic categories, and employers are liable only for
those hazards that their actions create.
A.

Statutory Language and Legislative History

The two central sections of the Act discussed by the OCAW
court-the purpose section and the general duty clause-contain language that suggests a substantially broader construction of the Act than
the one formulated by Judge Bork. First, in the Act's purpose section,
Congress established the goal not only of achieving "safe and healthful
working conditions," but also of "preserving . . .human resources. "92
The hazard alleged by the Secretary in OCAW destroyed human resources in that it led to the loss of workers' reproductive capacities. A
long-recognized rule of statutory construction holds that "effect must be
given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute;"s yet
the OCAW court, in construing the purpose section of the statute, omitted the "preservation of human resources" language. If, as Judge Bork
asserted, the Act's provisions must be defined in light of the purpose
90 Ironically, the term "draconian" has been used in criticizing policies designed to
protect the environment. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 661 (3d
Cir. 1976) ("The draconian consequences of EPA's strict insistence on the July 1, 1977
deadline, Bethlehem contends, is inconsistent with Congressional awareness of the unwelcome economic impact of the overly zealous pursuit of environmental goals."); see
also California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 489 (E.D. Cal. 1980) ("a draconian
choice between the extreme of all wilderness, and ten other alternatives").
11 See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
92 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1982).
93 2A C. SANDS, supra note 22, § 46.06, at 63.
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clause,94 "hazards" as used in the general duty clause should be read to
include both unsafe or unhealthful working conditions and the destruction of human resources. So construed, American Cyanamid's sterilization policy belongs within the scope of the Act.
Second, the general duty clause indicates a concern for worker
health that extends beyond physical conditions of the workplace. The
clause requires the employer to furnish both "employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards." 95 The legislative history describes the duty imposed on employers as prohibiting
those actions that bring harm to workers,98 and nowhere is this prohibition limited to physical conditions of the workplace or tangible
hazards. If it were so limited, the inclusion of both "employment" and
"place of employment" in the general duty clause would be redundant.
If Congress intended to limit an employer's duty to the provision of a
workplace free of physical hazards, only "place of employment" need
have been mentioned. The Senate report's 97 explanation of the general
duty clause indicates that it was meant to cover broadly employer actions that result in harm to employees: "The committee believes that
employers are equally bound by this general and common duty to bring
no adverse effects to the life and health of their employees throughout
the course of their employment." '
Throughout the OSH Act there are provisions that reach beyond
the physical conditions of the workplace. The Act creates legal rights
under which the employee can protect her health and job.99 The Senate
report's discussion of the Act and its purpose 0 ° shows that Congress
" See OCAW, 741 F.2d at 447.
" Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
(1982) (emphasis added).
98 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL-

FARE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT 905 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
98

Id. at 149.

" To ensure that this process functions effectively, the Act expressly accords to every employee several rights, the exercise of which may not subject him to discharge or discrimination. An employee is given the right to
inform OSHA of an imminently dangerous workplace condition or practice and request that OSHA inspect that condition or practice. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(0(1). He is given a limited right to assist the OSHA inspector in
inspecting the workplace, §§ 657(a)(2), (e), and (f)(2), and the right to
aid a court in determining whether or not a risk of imminent danger in
fact exists. See § 660(c)(1). Finally, an affected employee is given the
right to bring an action to compel the Secretary to seek injunctive relief if
he believes the Secretary has wrongfully declined to do so. § 662(d).
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1980).
"I0LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 97, at 142.
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intended to attack the problem of risks to employee health in its scientific, 01° ethical, 0 2 medical,' 0 3 and social'0 4 dimensions. In upholding
the lead standard, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit echoed
this concern for providing the Secretary of Labor with broad authority:
The face of the statute and the legislative history both
demonstrate unmistakably that OSHA's statutory mandate
is, as a general matter, broad enough to include such a regulation as MRP [medical removal protection]. A number of
terms of the statute give OSHA almost unlimited discretion
to devise means to achieve the congressionally mandated
goal. Thus OSHA is to ensure worker safety and health "by
developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches
for dealing with occupational safety and health problems[.]"
. . . In the OSH Act Congress invested a new agency
with extremely broad jurisdiction to prevent all types of
safety and health hazards throughout American industry.' 05
B.

Case Law

The statutory provisions and legislative history discussed above
Cf Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b)(5)-(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b)(5)-(6) (1982):
101

The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources(5) by providing for research in the field of occupational safety and
health, including the psychological factors involved, and by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems;
(6) by exploring ways to discover latent diseases, establishing causal
connections between diseases and work in environmental conditions, and
conducting other research relating to health problems, in recognition of the
fact that occupational health standards present problems often different
from those involved in occupational safety . ...
102

See

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 97, at 143.

See id. at 142; cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. § 651(b)(7) (1982): ("providing medical criteria which will assure insofar as
practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or life
expectancy as a result of his work experience").
104See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 97, at 145.
10' United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1230, 1232 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981) (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, § 2(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(5) (1982) (citations and footnotes omitted).
101
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demonstrate a congressional concern not only with the tangibility and
location of occupational hazards, but also with the employer's role in
creating them. In determining the scope of OSHA jurisdiction, courts
have considered various factors, including conditions of employment, 0 6
economic coercion of employees, 10 7 and work-relatedness of hazards.10 8

What unifies these considerations is a concern with the employer's role
in the creation of hazards. While this Comment argues that OSHA
should have jurisdiction where the employer contributes to the creation
of the hazard, the OCAW court has precluded substantial inquiry into
employer policies that are hazardous to employees by its categorical differentiation between "tangible" and "economic and social" factors.
Other courts, however, have considered factors from both of these categories, in addition to factors more appropriately characterized as somewhere in between, to determine if the employer's role in creating the
hazard was sufficient to support a finding of OSHA jurisdiction.
In Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor,10 9 the court used a
"condition of employment" test to determine whether the "degree of
coercion [brought] the hazards of apartment living" 110 within the scope
of OSHA jurisdiction. The court conceived of the hazard as resulting
both from the tangible conditions of the housing and the "practical,
economical,

. . .

or physical" necessities of migrant employment, 1 1

and established that an employer requirement or geographic necessity
to dwell in the housing would serve as a basis for OSHA
jurisdiction.1
106

See Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir.

1983).

107 See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 1979), afl'd,
445 U.S. 1 (1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
108 See Forging Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 748 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir.
1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
The legal rule proposed in this Comment, which employs a concept of "work
relatedness," must be distinguished from the Commission discussion of "work relatedness," cited with approval by Judge Bork: "'Congress conceived of occupational
hazards in terms of processes and materials which cause injury or disease by operating
directly upon employees as they engage in work or work-related activities.'" OCAW,
741 F.2d at 449. The Commission and.Judge Bork did not seem to view the act of
registering in a hospital and undergoing surgical sterilization as a "work-related activity," even when such an act was a condition of employment. This reasoning, however,
would probably remove from the category of "work-related activity" the act of undergoing employer-required prophylactic lead chelation therapy in a doctor's office. This
Comment's approach requires that any activity carried out as a condition of employment must be viewed as "work-related."
1- 696 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1983).
110 Id. at 1333.
111 Id.

112 Id.
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In United Steelworkers v. Marshall,"3 the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals considered economic factors, namely employee wage and seniority rights, in evaluating employer responsibility for the treatment of
lead-exposed workers. The case concerned an industry challenge to several provisions of the OSHA-promulgated lead standard, including the
medical removal protection (MRP) provisions." 4 The Steelworkers
court considered both the tangible hazards of lead poisoning and the
impact of the employers' job security policy on workers suffering from
lead exposure:
Here, we have no trouble upholding the agency's decision as reasonable and well grounded in the evidence ...
OSHA found . . . that unless workers were guaranteed

all their wage and seniority rights upon removal, they would
resist cooperating with the medical surveillance program that
determined the need for removal, since they reasonably
might fear being fired or sent to lower-paying jobs if they
revealed dangerously high blood-lead levels. The record
showed that workers often consumed self-prescribed chelating agents, and lied to physicians about their subjective
symptoms, all because they held job security more dearthan
their health." 5
In a post-OCAW case from the Fourth Circuit, ForgingIndustry
'1- 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
114 See id. at 1229-30 (MRP requires that the employer "must maintain the
worker's earnings and seniority rights . . . for a period of 18 months" when the lead
standard mandates worker removal from the job due to high lead content in the blood.);
see also OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Toxic and Hazardous Substances: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k) (1984).
"1 647 F.2d at 1237. The court also considered social factors in upholding the
Multiple Physician Review Mechanism of the lead standard:
Lacking total trust in both the honesty and the competence of company doctors, OSHA included in its detailed rules on medical surveillance
a scheme called the Multiple Physician Review Mechanism.
.
[Any device designed primarily to enhance workers' confidence
in the physicians who examine them for lead disease will in turn enhance
their health, since an employee who trusts the integrity and skill of the
examining physician will more likely cooperate in, and thereby improve
the accuracy of, the examination.
Id. at 1238-39 (footnote omitted). But see American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1980), in which the Supreme Court did not decide the question of
OSHA authority to require wage protection of employees transferred from high cotton
dust areas because they were unable to wear a Tespirator. The Court held that OSHA
had "failed to make the necessary determination or statement of reasons that its wage
guarantee requirement is related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work environment." Id. at 537-38.
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Association v. Secretary of Labor,116 the court adopted a work-relatedness test for determining OSHA jurisdiction over employer actions that
may create a hazard of hearing loss from noise exposure.117 The core of
the work-relatedness test is a determination of employer responsibility
for creating the hazard. The case concerned a challenge to a hearing
conservation amendment of the OSHA occupational noise exposure
standard. The amendment compelled employers to institute remedial
measures-including medical tests, industrial hygiene controls, educational training, and records retention-for the protection of employees
who had suffered a hearing loss known as a standard threshold shift
(STS)." 8
In Forging Industry, the majority and the dissent agreed that a
work-relatedness test was appropriate; they disagreed, however, on the
factual characterization of the hazard. The majority found that the
amendment compelled the employer to institute remedial measures even
if the STS resulted from hazards existing outside the workplace (nonoccupational noise exposure) such as "hunting rifles [or] . . .loud music.""' 9 The majority vacated the amendment because it found that the
amendment made "no distinction between hearing loss caused by workplace sources and loss caused by non-workplace sources."' ° The majority found that the work-relatedness of the noise hazard targeted by
the amendment could not be clearly established.
The dissent, also applying a work-relatedness test,' criticized the
majority decision on two grounds: first, the majority did not sufficiently
defer to the Secretary's conclusion that the hearing loss covered by the
amendment was employment-related; and second, the majority mischaracterized the factual nature of the hazard. On its second point of
disagreement, the dissent offered this analogy:
Breathing automobile exhaust and general air pollution, for
example, is not healing to a wounded lung. That hardly justifies failure to regulate noxious workplace fumes that inflicted the primary wound. Nor would there be logic to characterizing regulation of the fumes as non-occupational
because the condition inflicted is aggravated by outside
irritants. 2
116748 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1984).

See id. at 214.
"" See OSHA Occupational Health and Environmental Control: Occupational
Noise Exposure, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1984).
119 748 F.2d at 214.
17

120 Id.

121
122

See id. at 215 (Sprouse, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 216.
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charAccording to the dissent, the occupational noise exposure could be
123
acterized as the "primary risk factor" involved in hearing loss.
Although Forging Industry, Steelworkers, and Frank Diehl
Farms concern standards developed under section 6 of the OSH Act,
and OCAW concerns a citation under the Section 5 general duty clause,
each of these cases addresses the scope of the Act. In the three section 6
cases discussed, the employer's role in creating the hazard was determinative on the question of OSHA authority or jurisdiction. In Frank
Diehl Farms, because the employer allowed workers the choice of living either in migrant housing or in other housing,"" the court held that
the employer's role in creating the hazard was insufficient to support
OSHA jurisdiction. In Steelworkers, the court identified a significant
employer role in creating economic disincentives for workers to participate in a lead disease medical screening program; OSHA therefore had
the authority to intervene and eliminate these disincentives. 25 In Forging Industry, the majority and the dissent disagreed as to the workrelatedness of the hearing loss over which OSHA had assumed jurisdiction. The majority vacated the amendment because it found that employers could not be held liable for noise hazards, such as rock music,
126
that they had no role in creating.
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Forging
Industry demonstrates that the inquiry into the employer's role in creating a hazard does not provide clear answers in all cases. Using this
line of inquiry as a basis of determining OSHA jurisdiction does, however, avoid the unrealistic categorizing of causal factors of worker
health hazards as either "tangible" or "economic and social." A focus
on the employer's role in creating hazards also forces courts to recognize and consider that often employer policies have characteristics of
both categories. Finally, determining OSHA jurisdiction based on the
employer's role in creating the hazard establishes an acceptable middle
ground between two draconian rules of law: on the one hand, a rule
that finds employers liable 'in all circumstances imaginable' and, on the
other, a rule that immunizes employer policies from the Act. Where, as
with American Cyanamid's sterilization policy, the employee harm results from an employee fulfilling a condition of employment, the employer's role in creating the hazard should support a finding of OSHA
jurisdiction.
123

See id.

See 696 F.2d at 1327.
115 See 647 F.2d at 1237.
126 See 748 F.2d at 214-15.
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CONCLUSION

In the fifteen years of the OSH Act's existence, the Secretary has
acted to prevent lead disease and other dangerous occupational hazards
by exercising broad authority. The Secretary has regulated in such divergent realms as temporary labor camps,127 worker access to medical
records,' 2 8 prevention of discrimination against employees exercising
statutory rights,' 2 9 worker education,' worker choice of physicians,'
and wage protection of workers suffering from lead exposure. 3 2 Prevention of future occupational health problems, particularly in the area
of genetic and reproductive hazards, will require creative public health
intervention. Such hazards could vary considerably from worker to
worker, as a function of either genetic characteristics or family planning attitudes. These variables may be the subject of controversial employer policies, whether implemented merely to avoid liability or to
prevent illness and injury in the workplace. In either case, if such a
policy is deemed to operate beyond the physical conditions of the workplace, it will be immune from OSHA regulation under Judge Bork's
construction of the Act. Ensuring that such policies do not unnecessarily harm workers or coerce them into substituting job security for
health requires the delegation of a flexible and broad authority to the
Secretary. The legislative history cited by the D.C. Circuit in United
Steelworkers v. Marshall33 reflects such an awareness: "'Neither bill
contains . . .a list of specific "do's and don'ts" for keeping workplaces

safe and healthful. Industrial safety and health problems are as complex and changing as American industry itself. They cannot be solved
by a lengthy list of prohibitions spelled out in a statute.' ")134
The construction of the OSH Act formulated in OCAW prohibits
the Secretary from reaching hazards resulting from factors deemed to
127 See OSHA General Environmental Controls: Temporary Labor Camps, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.142 (1984).
128 See OSHA General Safety and Health Provisions: Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1984).
129 See Discrimination Against Employees Under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Exercise of any Right Afforded by the Act, 29
C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1984).
130 OSHA has provided grants for worker health and safety education and training programs ("New Directions Training and Education Grants") pursuant to the Secretary's authority under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 670
(1982). See 48 Fed. Reg. 46,108 (1983).
131 See OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances: Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.10250)(3)(iii) (1984).
132 See id. § 1910.1025(k)(2)(i)-(iii).
133 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
134 Id. at 1230 (quoting Senator Saxbe, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 97, at
297-98).

1985]

SHRINKING OF THE OSH ACT

1191

be "economic and social." Only tangible hazards such as chemical
fumes and unsafe machines seem to be within the Act's scope. If followed, this decision may preclude the Secretary from preventing a
whole range of dangerous and harmful industry policies. Thus it is
suggested that courts reject Judge Bork's interpretation of the OSH Act
and formulate legal standards that allow the Act to function to protect
workers as Congress intended it to. The formulation proposed
here-liability following from an employer's hazard-creating actions-both protects the American worker and places liability where it
is due.

